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Abstract. This paper is an experimental exploration of the relationship
between the runtimes of Turing machines and the length of proofs in
formal axiomatic systems. We compare the number of halting Turing
machines of a given size to the number of provable theorems of first-order
logic of a given size, and the runtime of the longest-running Turing
machine of a given size to the proof length of the most-difficult-to-prove
theorem of a given size. It is suggested that theorem provers are subject
to the same non-linear tradeoff between time and size as computer
programs are, affording the possibility of determining optimal timeouts
and waiting times in automatic theorem proving. I provide the statistics
for some small choices of parameters for both of these systems.
Keywords: halting problem, halting probability, proof length, auto-
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1 Introduction
While profound connections between computer programs and mathemat-
ical proofs have been studied and are known (e.g. the Curry-Howard cor-
respondence), little has been done to connect the two fields at the level of
empirical practice. We present an experimental approach to the question
of optimal proving times for automatic theorem provers, which bears out
Calude and Stay’s theoretical findings that programs either stop quickly
or never halt [4].
Working with self-delimiting programs, that is, programs that are not
the beginning of any other valid programs, Chaitin defined the complexity
of the runtime of a program which eventually halts that we cannot effec-
tively compute [5], and Calude and Stay have recently proven [4] that
even though short programs can run for a very long time, long programs
are the scarcest because most of them will stop rather quickly—if they
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ever do—depending on their length. Thus, the probability of a machine
halting decreases the longer it takes to halt, if it ever does.
Just as Calude and Stay suggest that most Turing machines are fully
determined qua termination by a small number of computational steps,
and that the error margin drops drastically, in [8] we have also shown
that Turing machines are fully determined qua extensionality by a small
number of initial input values (a theoretical value for the error margin has
yet to be determined but the very few data points that we could generate
suggest to follow at least a polynomial distribution).
We undertake an experimental approach to the runtimes of determin-
istic Turing machines up to three states and two symbols in connection,
and empirical evidence, to Calude and Stay’s theoretical results. Then we
undertake the same experimental approach to formulas of predicate calcu-
lus, in order to find some (if any) evidence in favour of a possible similar
non-linear phenomenon in the distribution of proof lengths of (dis)proven
theorems in random axiom systems and Turing machines.
Traditional intuition might make one think this an ill-fated approach.
On the one hand because undecidability would interfere in any such exper-
imental attempt, and on the other hand, because small systems may say
more about design choices than about important results. Even though pos-
sible limiting effects may appear right away one can limitedly circumvent
these limits (as the Busy Beaver problem does) in an effort tantamount
to other interesting experiments including some of Calude’s own interest
[3] or of my own [7], this latter providing useful applications for the eval-
uation of the algorithmic complexity of short strings difficult to calculate
with the other alternative (lossless compression algorithms). With the in-
tuition one gets from studying small systems (see [13]), it seems worth it
and insightful to undertake these kind of experiments.
1.1 The halting problem
The Halting Problem for Turing machines involves deciding whether an
arbitrary Turing machineM eventually halts on an arbitrary input x. One
can ask whether there is a Turing machine halt M which, given code (M)
and the input x, eventually stops and produces 1 if M(x) stops, and 0
if M(x) does not stop. Turing’s seminal result states that this problem
cannot be solved by any Turing machine, i.e. there is no such halt M .
Halting can be recognized by simply running the machine in question; the
main difficulty is to detect non-halting machines.
Since many real-world problems arising in the fields of compiler opti-
mization, automatized software engineering, formal proof systems, and so
forth are deeply connected to the halting problem, there is an interest in
understanding the problem in order to translate theoretical results into
practical applications.
In [4], it was observed that for any computable probability distribu-
tion, most long times are effectively rare, so that at the limit they all had
the same behavior regardless of the choice of distribution. They proved
that the exact time at which a program stops is not too complicated al-
gorithmically. It is (algorithmically) non-random because most programs
either stop ‘quickly’ or never halt. Since non-random times are (effec-
tively) rare, according to Calude and Stay, the density of times at which
an N -bit program can stop decreases quickly.
2 The Busy Beaver problem
There are (4n+2)2n possible (n, 2) deterministic Turing machines with n
states and 2 symbols. We denote by (n,m) the class (or space) of all n-state
m-symbol Turing machines having a bidirectional tape and remaining on
the same cell when entering the (additional to n) halting state. Among
the machines that halt, there are some that print more 1s on their output
tapes than any other Turing machines of the same size, and some that
reach a maximum number of steps upon halting.
If σT is the number of 1s on the tape of a Turing machine T upon halt-
ing, then:
∑
(n) = max {σT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts} with n the number
of states of the Turing machine.
If tT is the number of steps that a machine T takes upon halting, then
S(n) = max {tT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts} with n the number of states of
the Turing machine.∑
(n) and S(n) are noncomputable functions [9] by reduction to the
halting problem. Yet values are known for (n, 2) with n ≤ 4. The solution
for (n, 2) with n < 3 is trivial; the process leading to the solution in (3, 2)
is discussed by Lin and Rado [11]; and the process leading to the solution
in (4, 2) is discussed in [1].
Solving the halting problem for small machines It is easy to see
that
∑
(1) = 1 and
∑
(2) = 4. Lin and Rado [9] proved
∑
(3) = 6 and
Brady [1] that
∑
(4) = 13. The exact known values for S are S(1) = 1,
S(2) = 6, S(3) = 21, S(4) = 107. These Busy Beaver values are for
2-symbol Turing machines.
These numerical values of the Busy Beaver functions have been calcu-
lated by a combination of techniques, notably the exhaustive simulation of
a reduced number of non-equivalent Turing machines, as it turns out that
many can be decided (e.g. evident loops, etc) and because the number of
cases is small enough one can either analyse case by case or actually run
the machines and analyse their behaviour until deciding whether it halts
or not. This is evidently possible because of the relatively small number of
Turing machines with up to the number of states for for which the values
of the Busy Beaver functions are known.
A program showing the evolution of all known Busy Beaver machines
developed by this paper’s authors is available online [15]. The formalism
followed in this paper is the same as the one originally described and
followed for the Busy Beaver problem as introduced by Rado [9].
It is worth noting that the Busy Beaver problem is defined for Turing
machines with initial empty tapes, and Turing machines studied in this
paper are all provided with an initially empty tapes too. Turing univer-
sality tells us, however, that for every Turing machine with an arbitrary
input there is a Turing machine with empty input computing the same
function, hence Turing machines with empty tapes cover all possible cases
(the translation may only result in some extra states).
3 Halting and runtime distributions
Calude and Stay showed that “long-running" Turing machines can only
halt at non-random times; the density of non-random times near n is about
1/n. “Long-running" means that if we have a universal Turing machine U
and machine M is implemented by a program m for U of length n, then
U(m) runs for more than c × 2n steps, where c is some uncomputable
constant depending on U .
3.1 Halting history of (2, 2) Turing machines
We know that a machine halts if it enters the halting state before reaching
the known Busy Beaver value S(n). If it does not, then it never halts. The
halting problem and the halting probability problem are closely related
to the Busy Beaver problem in that a solution to any one of them would
yield a solution to each of the others.
Consider the halting space of all (2, 2) Turing machines (with an extra
halting state) provided with an empty tape. The table in Fig. 1 shows the
runtime distribution at which all machines in (2, 2) halt (or do not).
There are 10 000 2-state, 2-symbol Turing machines (the 10 000 figure
comes simply from the formula giving the number of Turing machines
t kt p(kt)
− 6544 0.65
1 2000 0.20
2 800 0.080
3 160 0.016
4 56 0.0056
5 362 0.036
6 78 0.0078
Fig. 1. Runtime distribution at which all machines halt (those that don’t are indicated
by “—”). Where t is the number of steps, kt the number of machines that halted at t
(out of a total of 3456 that halt), and p(kt) is the halting probability of a machine to
halt (or not) in time t.
with n = 2 states (4n + 2)2n). No other Turing machine halts after 6
steps (see Fig. 1) in (2, 2). Machines that never halt are 6544 in number,
representing around .65 of the total.
What we term a runtime space is the product of a class of (n,m) Turing
machines for fixed n and m, where programs are uniformly distributed,
and the time space, which is discrete, has a halting time mapped to a
greyscale color (the lighter the color, the sooner it halted; white means
the program never halted and red means it reached the Busy Beaver value
S(n)).
Fig. 2. Halting color mapping spectrum for Turing machines in (2, 2) (the last color is
red, visible in the online and printed versions only).
Each point in Fig. 3 represents a Turing machine and as defined by
the corresponding spectrum in Fig. 2, the lighter the square the sooner
it halted. White cells represent machines that don’t halt. Red cells (only
visible in the online and color printed versions) show the Busy Beaver
machines (for this space, with runtime S(2) = 6 steps).
Among all the 3456 Turing machines in (2, 2) that halt, .65 of them
do so after the first step, .2 do so after the second, .05 after the third,
and so on. In other words, .57 out of the 3456 (2, 2) Turing machines that
Fig. 3. Runtime distribution plot showing all the 10 000 Turing machines in (2, 2) com-
pressed in a Peano curve packing array (preserving the enumeration distance between
machines). Some clusters may emerge due to the enumeration (e.g. terms involving
transition rule parameters grouping Turing machines). The plot may look as if it had
less than the necessary rows and columns to represent all the 10 000 Turing machines,
but that is a consequence of the Peano packing, each apparent pixel is in fact a small
cluster of several machines.
halted did so at the first step, .81 halted before or by the second step at
the latest, .84 before or by the third step at the latest, and so on (see Fig.
6).
3.2 Halting history of (3, 2) Turing machines
Interesting output distribution facts:
– Out of 7 529 536 machines only 2 146 912 halt.
– There are 5 382 624 machines that do not halt.
– Those machines that halt only produce 126 different output strings,
with the largest being 6 digits in length (the Busy Beavers).
– Exactly .2 of the Turing machines produce a 0 or a 1 as output.
The fact that the figures are mostly white and lightly colored is an
indicator of the sparsity of non-halting or quickly-halting machines.
t kt 100× 214−t p(kt)
− 5382624 0.71
1 1075648 819200 0.14
2 614656 409600 0.082
3 263424 204800 0.035
4 97216 102400 0.013
5 53760 51200 0.0071
6 20800 25600 0.0028
7 12512 12800 0.0017
8 4264 6400 0.00057
9 2424 3200 0.00032
10 1064 1600 0.00014
11 536 800 0.000071
12 304 400 0.000040
13 176 200 0.000023
14 128 100 0.000017
Fig. 4. Where t is the number of steps, kt the number of machines that halted at t,
and p(kt) is the halting probability calculated from t and kt. 100×214−t is a good fit to
the limit behavior as a function relating runtimes and the number of Turing machines
halting at a certain runtime for the 14 runtimes at which Turing machines halt.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
runtime
200 000
400 000
600 000
800 000
1´ 106
number of
machines
Fig. 5. Number of machines in (3, 2) that halt step by step versus 100 × 214−t (dark
line (blue in color version)).
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runtime
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9.0
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9.2
number of
machines HlogL
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
runtime
14.0
14.1
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14.3
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14.5
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number of
machines HlogL
Fig. 6. Accumulated number of machines in (2, 2) (left) and (3, 2) (right) that halt
step by step.
Fig. 7. Halting spectrum for (3, 2). Last color in the spectrum is red (only visible in
the online and color printed versions)
Fig. 8. Runtime deep field of a segment of runtimes from the 7 529 536 Turing machines
in (3, 2). The (3, 2) Busy Beavers are barely visible as isolated red points (online and
color printed versions only).
Fig. 9. This is what a typical random part of the runtime deep field looks like after a
10× zoom from a 10th. square area of the original (Fig. 8) image.
4 Gödel meets Turing in the computational universe
Inspired by [13] where Wolfram undertakes an exhaustive investigation of
the space of propositional logic formulas, I extended his ideas to inves-
tigate the space of first order logic. The extension wasn’t trivial, among
other reasons because unlike propositional calculus, predicate calculus is
undecidable, meaning that one may come across cases where formulas (or
their negations) are not proven or disproven in an axiom system of first
order logic.
Proof lengths are, of course, not bounded, or one would be able to
decide whether a formula in an axiom system can be proven or not if it
has reached a limit. Frequency of proof lengths for randomly generated
formulas, however, can be studied and analyzed. Frequency distributions
of (dis)proven formulas turn out to follow a similar distribution to those
of randomly generated computer programs, in which most programs, just
as we found for formulas, halt (or are (dis)proven) quickly, with their
number diminishing fast over time. When I met Cris Calude and became
acquainted with his fascinating work, including a recent collaboration
with Michael Stay on the distribution of halting times of random com-
puter programs [4], it prompted me to seek connections with these other
findings—persuaded as I was of the strong connections known to exist
between computation and proof theory—and to undertake an empirical
investigation of both the halting runtimes of Turing machines that Calude
and Stay had calculated theoretically, and the lengths of proofs found by
automatic theorem provers.
It follows from Chaitin [5] and Calude and Stay [4] that to (dis)prove
a formula in an axiom system one only needs to check up to the run-
time for which the Turing machine encoding the proof no longer halts.
Busy Beavers, as used in the previous section, are therefore relevant to
automatic theorem proving because they provide an upper bound on the
length of proofs. One only needs to run the computer to (dis)prove the
formula up to the Busy Beaver value of the size of the Turing machine,
and if it cannot be proven by then then it is undecidable for that axiom
system. Moreover, Calude and Stay’s work may then suggest that chances
of proving a formula should decrease over time, or that if a formula can
be (dis)proven it will likely do so early in time rather than later meaning
that one can set an optimal time for a given provability certainty goal.
4.1 Computer runtimes and lengths of proofs
Optimal proving times are relevant because, on the one hand, they may
allow one to set a maximum waiting time, given that proofs may never
arrive if a theorem is undecidable in an axiom system, but also because
one would know how long to wait before giving up with a certain degree of
certainty of provability. If one had a goal (say to prove a fraction of .90 of
a set of formulas) one could calculate an optimal timeout and a maximum
waiting time, taking advantage of the fact that in the case of theorem
provers running on digital computers, there is a correspondence between
runtime and proof length. The numbers involved are so large and grow
so fast because of the combinatoric explosion (in the number of formulas
as well as the number of Turing machines). We were only able to explore
the tip of the iceberg of the space of all possible first-order formulas, but
with interesting and encouraging results nonetheless.
4.2 Enumerating and generating predicate calculus axiom
systems with equality
A number of sound and complete calculi have been developed enabling
fully automated theorem provers for first-order logic. Equational logic is
quite simple, and yet powerful [2]. Its atomic formulas are equations, mak-
ing it very easy to encode and deal with. In our formalism, terms are first-
order formulas built from variables and constants using function symbols.
Equalities of the form lhs = rhs are the atomic formulas in our language,
where lhs and rhs are terms. One can represent most mathematical axiom
systems and theorems in equational form, so it is expressively very rich.
A logical system which possesses an explicitly stated set of axioms from
which theorems can be derived is an axiomatic system.
In predicate calculus, a formula is in prenex normal form if it can be
written as a string of quantifiers followed by a quantifier-free part. All
first-order well-formed formulas (hereafter simply ‘formulas’) are logically
equivalent to some formula in prenex normal form. Skolemization is a way
of removing existential quantifiers from a formula. Variables bound by ex-
istential quantifiers which are not within the scope of universal quantifiers
can simply be replaced by the appropriate constants. Both will be used
in order to enumerate all possible quantified axioms and formulas of first
order logic.
All equational formulas can be represented with two binary operators
f and p, where p is a pairing function and f is an indexing operator (any
possible binary function). The first parameter of f will be a constant de-
termining its index, while the second is any other term (variable, constant,
f itself or p).
When the existential quantifier is inside a universal quantifier, the
bound variable must be replaced by a Skolem function of the variables
bound by universal quantifiers. We can then specify any constant using a
formula of the form: ∀a∀bf(a, a) = f(b, b). And the i−th constant can be
defined in terms of f and p recursively as follows:
c(0)=p(f(a, a), f(a, a))
c(n+1)=p(f(a, a), c(n))
Or in a single Mathematica expression:
Nest[p[f[a,a],#]&,p[a,a],i]
To represent all possible functions one can combine both f and p. For
instance, f(c(i), p(c(i), x)) is the expression representing the i-th function
(the function with index i) of x. This assumes that there are an infinite
number of individuals in the most general case. Notice that x may be a
list built from pairs.
Formulas were enumerated and generated by the number of variables
and constants on both sides of the equality. There are no formulas of
length 1, simply because an equality requires at least 2 terms on each
side. Finally, all single axioms were arranged by length. The length of an
equational formula is the sum of the bound variables on both sides of the
equality. Axiom systems are simply all the possible subsets over the for-
mulas of fixed length. Applying this operation makes the number of axiom
systems to grow exponentially, so we were able to proceed exhaustively
only up to 3 bound variables formulas and to generate a sample of 1000
axiom systems only (an initial segment) for 4 bound variables formulas.
An automatic theorem prover was fed with all 4 bound variable single
formulas as its proving goal for each of the generated axiom system, pro-
ducing almost 10×103 proofs. Among the initial 1000 axiom systems, 607
were used only, as they were proven to be consistent (no axiom was the
negation of any other) and independent (no axiom could be derived from
the others).
An example of a formula with 3 bound variables is: ∀x1∀x2∀x3 , x1 =
f(f(x2, x3), x1) and with four: ∀x1∀x2∀x3∀x4 , x1 = p(f(x2, x3), x4). An
example of an axiom system consisting of 2 axioms each with 2 bound
variables is: ∀x1∀x2 , x1 = f(x2, x1) ∧ ∀x1∀x2 , x1 = p(x1, x2). Notice that
one does not need to further compose f with p or p with f in order to
produce other possible formulas, because f is a general function with an
index as first parameter and any term as second parameter which can be
p or f itself, without the need of infinitely nesting each into the other in
order to reach other possible constructions.
4.3 Experimental setting
The project was undertaken using Mathematica’s built-in implementa-
tion of the well known and award-winning theorem prover Waldmeister1.
Waldmeister returns True after evaluating an expression in Mathematica
if it can prove the conclusions from the given axioms, and False if it can
prove that the conclusions do not follow from the axioms. If it cannot
prove either, it returns Unevaluated.
The axiom systems generated—as described in section 4.2—were first
checked for logical consistency and internal axiom independence, these
being two of the most important qualities of conventional mathematical
axiom systems. A is said to be consistent if no theorem and its negation
can be derived from A. On the other hand, if A is an axiom system and
a ∈ A, then a is considered independent in A, or an independent axiom of
A if a cannot be derived from A−{a}. As with any axiomatic system, we
want this axiomatic system to be minimal, i.e. to contain no superfluous
axiom. From this point on, only consistent axiom systems were taken
1 http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~hillen/waldmeister/ (August, 2011).
into account.
Miscellaneous interesting first results:
– It was found that only .01 out of a total of 490 axiomatic systems with
1 or 2 axioms of length up to 3 bound variables were non-independent,
i.e. one of its members could be derived from a combination of the
others.
– All the 29 axiomatic systems of length 3 with 2 or more axioms were in-
dependent. This could be explained by the way in which the axiomatic
systems were enumerated, because axioms closer to each other in the
enumeration seem to have a better chance of being derived from each
other. The condition of being a theorem or an axiom is evidently an
arbitrary convention.
– The number of consistent axiom systems of length 3 was only .0342
percent of a total of 1024 initial axiomatic systems.
– In the case of axiom systems of length 4 (composed by formulas of
that size), .607 of them were found to be consistent. This may be
interpreted in two different ways: that even when the complexity of
the axiom systems grows, the overall inconsistency does not increase,
or else that the process only unveils the tip of the iceberg, where they
are consistent chiefly due to their simplicity (both in terms of number
of axioms per axiom system and the length of the axioms themselves,
thereby reducing the possible number of clashes).
4.4 Distribution of proof lengths
The relation between the length of the formulas and the optimal runtime
limit is of particular utility when no upper bound is known (or possible),
when, for example, there are non-provable formulas for which longer run-
times will not make any difference—which, as verified herein, would cover
a negligible number of cases.
A total of 89 145 formulas out of the 97 727 with at most 4 variables
were proven to be theorems (or their negations) after a single step. One
can call such a theorem trivial simply because its proof, requiring only 1
step, can be accomplished with an axiom, therefore itself being an axiom.
The proof length (t) distribution (in percentage) of formulas with up to 4
variables is as shown in Fig. 10.
Proof length distribution of (dis)proven theorems. Where t is the num-
ber of steps the theorem prover has taken to produce the proof, kt the
number of machines that halted at t, and p(kt) is the halting probability
t kt p(kt)
1 89145 91.2184
2 2311 2.36475
3 473 0.484001
4 931 0.952654
5 928 0.949584
6 426 0.435908
7 577 0.59042
8 834 0.853398
9 1344 1.37526
10 294 0.300838
11 186 0.190326
12 206 0.210791
13 44 0.0450234
14 15 0.0153489
15 7 0.00716281
16 2 0.00204652
17 4 0.00409303
Fig. 10. Proof length (t) distribution (in percentage) of formulas with up to 4 variables.
of having (dis)proven k theorems in time t from which one can build a
probability distribution p(kt).
It is worth noting that the behavior of 10 graph resembles the first case
of (2, 2) Turing machines, where the number of machines that halted was
not strictly decreasing (unlike (3, 2) that was monotonically decreasing).
Already 0.912 out of the total number of theorems are proven by the
very first step, with that number dropping as the total is approached.
From the distribution it follows that going beyond the 7th. step to the
17 steps that require the longest proofs only adds .012 new (dis)proven
formulas to the total. Summary of proving times:
– A total of 89 145 formulas out of 97 727 were immediately proved (or
disproved) after the first step (i.e. 91.21%).
– 95.96 were proven after 5 steps, and 96 969 formulas were proven after
9 steps (which is almost half of the 17 maximum number of steps
reached by the formulas with 4 bound variables). That is, 99.22% of
the total.
– Letting the theorem prover run up to 17 steps only generates 758 new
proofs, that is only 0.77% of the total.
5 10 15
proof length
11.40
11.42
11.44
11.46
11.48
number of
theorems
HdisLproven HlogL
Fig. 11. Accumulated number of theorems (dis)proven step by step.
Fig. 12. Truth space of 97 727 proofs from the 607 consistent and independent axiom
systems (x axis) against 161 formulas (y axis) from formulas with 4 bound variables.
Every dot is a proof, a black square indicates that a particular theorem holds in a
particular axiom system (which explains the diagonal, among other patterns) and white
means the formula was proven to be false in the corresponding axiom system (i.e. the
negation is a theorem). No undecidable candidate was found.
Fig. 13. Color mapping spectrum for proofs of length 4.
As for Turing machines (see Fig. 8), the space of proof lengths (Fig.
14) is mostly white and lightly colored as an indicator of the sparsity of
Fig. 14. Proof length deep field plot from the 97 727 formulas of up to 4 variables.
formula Busy Beavers are barely visible as isolated red points (online and color printed
versions only). Points are arranged as in 12.
long proof lengths given that most formulas are (dis)proven very quickly,
suggesting that the distribution of proof lengths follows the distribution
of program runtimes.
5 Timeouts and optimal waiting times
As for Busy Beaver Turing machines, the values of which depend on the
size of the Turing machines (states and symbols), proof lengths depend
on the length of the formulas. One can define Busy Beaver formulas (the
values of which will be denoted by fBB(n)) as the formulas for which an
automatic theorem prover takes more time to (dis)prove whether a theo-
rem is decidable, or to produce the longest proof, among all the formulas
of a fixed length. Unlike Turing machines, however, the size of a formula
can take many forms, and may depend on the number of bound variables
(as was the case in the experiments undertaken here), the number of logi-
cal operators or the number of symbols in general. It also depends on the
formalism, just as Busy Beavers depend on the formalism used by Rado
[9]. Following the analogy, the values of fBB(n) would therefore work in
a similar way and may be used just as Busy Beaver Turing machine values
are currently used—for defining maximum runtimes and maximum out-
put lengths for (small) Turing machines, saving time once an upper limit
is known. The exact relation would also save considerable computational
resources in automatic theorem proving.
As explained before, the theoretical algorithmic analysis in [4] indi-
cates that a program that has not stopped after running for a long time
has smaller and smaller chances of eventually stopping, so the longer the
runtime (dis)proven fraction f(t) = 1/2t
t of theorems p(t) (first significant digit)
1 0.9 0.5
2 0.02 0.2
3 0.005 0.1
4 0.01 0.06
5 0.009 0.03
6 0.004 0.02
7 0.006 0.008
8 0.009 0.004
9 0.01 0.002
10 0.003 0.001
11 0.002 0.0005
12 0.002 0.0002
13 0.0005 0.0001
14 0.0002 0.00006
15 0.00007 0.00003
16 0.00002 0.00002
17 0.00001 0.00001
Fig. 15. Runtime distribution at which all machines halt (those that don’t are indicated
by “—”). Where t is the number of steps, kt the number of machines that halted at t
(out of a total of 3456 that halt), and p(kt) is the halting probability calculated from
t and kt.
time t the more unlikely the program is to halt. Calude and Stay’s re-
sults can be interpreted as follows: most Turing machines are fully deter-
mined qua termination by a small number of computational steps, and
the error margin upon betting that a Turing machine will halt drops ex-
ponentially. Because proofs are programs for automatic theorem prover
and one can connect this interpretation to the probability of a formula to
be (dis)proven in an axiom system with a confidence error margin to be
proven dropping fast.
Let the “optimal timeout” be the number of steps for which a frac-
tion of formulas from a set of fixed length is (dis)proven. Evidently,
proving time is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that the closest
to the maximum runtime (the Busy Beaver formula values), the great-
est the fraction of (dis)proven formulas. An optimal time OPTime for
a given goal γ implies that upon t one has reached a fraction γ of
(dis)proved formulas. Thus OPTime(n, γ) = min{t(n) : |αt(n)| = γ},
where n is the length of the set of formulas, γ the desired fraction of
(dis)proved formulas and |α| the number of formulas proven at time
t(n) ≥ 0. Obviously 0 < OPTime(n) ≤ fBB(n) for each time t > 0,
and OPTime(n) = fBB(n) if γ = 1, that is, if the fraction of formulas
to be (dis)proved is 1 (i.e. if the goal is to (dis)prove all the formulas of a
fixed length).
Just as with Busy Beavers, the exact value of OPTime(n) is uncom-
putable and unpredictable in general, but one can approach it. For exam-
ple, in our formalism, for 4 bound variables it can be calculated from the
probability distribution in 15. One can ascertain, for example, that from
a uniform distribution of randomly generated formulas, nearly .90 of the
formulas will be proven after the first step. And that the number of new
proofs from then on will rapidly drop as a function of the number of steps.
The value of OPTime(n) can also determine a timeout for single formulas,
given a confidence expectation. Which is to say that a single formula has,
for example, a .90 chance of being (dis)proven in the first step, and that
it has diminishing possibilities, if any, of being (dis)proven thereafter. We
think that the results are robust enough to model specifications of theorem
provers, despite not being completely independent. We were able to verify
the results using another very different theorem prover, the Automatic
Proof Search or AProS [10] for propositional logic and predicate calculus
(the theorem prover deals, however, with all sorts of other classical and
non-classical calculus). AProS uses the intercalation method to search for
normal natural deduction proofs not requiring a language in which the
atomic formulas are identities, unlike Waldmeister. Notice that for this
new case, the definition of the length of formulas was adjusted to the new
framework, given that since the prover calculus does not require equality,
no sense can be given to left or right hand sides. The set of randomly cho-
sen operators used to generate formulas were the classic and, or, implies
and double implies. AProS found proofs for .12 of the assertions (and for
.353 of a set of assertions with no-double conditionals), out of a random
choice of 1000 automatically generated predicate calculus assertions with
up to 4 quantifiers, 3 general functions, 3 logical operators and 3 variables.
The longest proof length (runtime) was 42 with an average proof length
of 13, and a distribution very close to the one described by Waldmeister
using Mathematica.
6 Concluding remarks and further work
A logically significant question concerns the structure of the theorems
established. If significant structural features are uncovered, then one could
generate randomly formulas of that structure and repeat the proof length
and runtime distribution experiments. It would be quite interesting, if one
could find, for example, systematic biases for different theorem provers
and theorem proving techniques when deviating in distribution from each
other.
One can continue the process of generalizing theoretical results from
computer programs to proof lengths and seek the equivalent of Busy
Beavers in sets of well defined proofs and theorem provers. Just as for
larger Busy Beaver Turing machine values, the computer time and re-
sources to explore much larger sets of proofs are out of reach. The ex-
periments suggest that the statistics for theorem proving times from ran-
domly generated formulas may follow a similar trend to the distribution
of runtimes of random computer programs. And that when searching for
proofs, appropriate timeouts can be set and optimal waiting times defined
depending on the size of the formulas as it has been determined that run-
times depend on the size of machines. It is too soon, however, to declare
any true resemblance and there are always dangers of extrapolating from
the behavior of small systems.
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